The VChK-OGPU Telegram channel and Rucriminal.info continue to analyze the deep crisis of the legal system that is happening in modern Russia. As a result, the fundamental principles of legality and justice are destroyed. The state authorities have effectively denounced the unspoken "social contract" with society - the one according to which citizens agree to abide by the laws, and the state undertakes to fairly apply these laws and protect the rights of all participants in society. Today, the Russian state itself violates the principles of legality: it adopts repressive laws that contradict common sense, makes court decisions that trample on the rule of law, and redistributes property in favor of close associates. As a result, the legitimacy of the rule of law has been undermined, and public trust in government institutions is rapidly declining.
The redistribution of property deserves special mention. In Putin's Russia, a practice has been established whereby large assets can be taken away from their previous owners under far-fetched pretexts and transferred to the "right people" from the government's inner circle. A classic example is the YUKOS case. In 2003-2004, the oil concern
YUKOS was ruined by astronomical additional tax assessments, its leaders
(Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev) were imprisoned, and its key asset, the Yuganskneftegaz enterprise, was sold at auction to the fictitious company Baikalfinansgroup. Within a few days, this unknown company was acquired by the state-owned Rosneft, effectively revealing the true beneficiaries. International arbitration subsequently established that the auction for the sale of Yuganskneftegaz was rigged: the state's goal was not to collect taxes, but to bankrupt YUKOS and appropriate its most valuable assets in favor of Rosneft and Gazprom. As a result, Rosneft, headed by Putin's long-time ally, received huge oil fields practically for free, turning from a small company into an oil giant. Khodorkovsky, who dared to finance the opposition, spent more than 10 years in prison. This precedent showed big business: any property is not protected if the authorities so desire. A decade later, a similar mechanism was repeated with the Bashneft company. In 2014, Bashneft shares, owned by the private holding AFK Sistema of businessman Vladimir Yevtushenkov, were seized in favor of the state under the pretext of violations during the previous privatization (although Yevtushenkov himself bought the asset legally and was recognized as a bona fide purchaser). Yevtushenkov was placed under house arrest until he essentially came to terms with the loss of the company. Two years later, the controlling stake in Bashneft was sold to Rosneft by order of the Russian government. Thus, here too, a profitable oil company passed from private hands to a state monopoly under the leadership of close associates. Later, Rosneft also filed a multi-billion dollar lawsuit against AFK Sistema, demanding compensation for mythical “losses” – that is, they tried to punish the former owner on top of that (this case was also considered with violations, causing protests from lawyers). Such stories are far from isolated: we can recall the bankruptcy of the Yugra bank, the raider takeovers of enterprises throughout the country through bribery of judges and security officials, the forced sale of assets of Western companies to the “national treasure” at bargain prices after 2022. Ownership rights in Russia are no longer sacred – if the powers that be take a fancy to a business object, it will be taken away, having found or fabricated “legal” grounds. After 2022, this mechanism reached a new, unprecedented level. Under the pretext of sanctions, "unfriendly actions" and threats to national security, a systematic expropriation of assets of foreign and a number of Russian companies began, accompanied by the formula of "temporary management" with the subsequent transfer of assets to new beneficiaries. In the summer of 2023, the Russian divisions of Danone and Carlsberg/Baltika came under such control - a few months later, the management of the companies was completely replaced by loyal persons, and the right to return assets was effectively lost. In 2024, Raven Russia, the largest warehouse real estate operator in the country, came under attack: an arbitration decision made behind closed doors recognized the MBO transactions as fictitious and transferred key facilities to structures associated with state banks. At the same time, high-profile seizures of assets in the IT and gaming industries took place - an example was Lesta Games, from which the court, at the request of the prosecutor's office, seized the business, justifying this by "financing extremism", although the evidence was indirect and politicized. All these cases have several features in common: the absence of real mechanisms for protecting property, the closed nature of key processes, and the fact that the final beneficiaries are pre-determined in a narrow circle close to power. A new judicial practice is being formed, in which arbitration and law enforcement agencies act as a single mechanism for the redistribution of assets - and act in such a way that no one one precedent did not create a tool for protecting future victims. This practice is being consolidated, and each new wave of seizures becomes larger in scale and less formally justified. The most important factor in the sustainability of this practice is that key government officials and security agencies are all involved in the redistribution processes. From ministers to regional chiefs, from investigative departments to courts - all links in the chain receive their share in the form of direct benefits, career bonuses or protection from a similar fate. Such a system seems strong only on the outside: in fact, it is based on mutual responsibility and corruption, which makes it an avalanche and uncontrollable. Any attempt to stop this flow will encounter resistance from the executors themselves, because the collapse of the scheme threatens them with the loss of not only privileges, but also freedom. As a result, the mechanism accelerates itself, absorbing more and more spheres, and it is this internal decomposition that becomes the main threat to the stability of the regime - the "kamikaze" regime. Thus, the Russian state itself is destroying the legal field, passing laws that are a blow to society and redrawing the economic map of the country at its own discretion. Constitutional rights are under attack - freedom of speech, personal inviolability, a fair trial, and the free disposal of property. When laws become a tool of intimidation and seizure, their legitimacy in the eyes of citizens disappears. The population sees that the law no longer protects the weak, but serves the strong; that the rules of the game are fickle, and anyone can become a victim of tyranny. As a result, legal nihilism is growing, people are becoming disillusioned with the possibility of achieving justice by legal means. This is an extremely dangerous trend, leading to further erosion of public order.
Historical parallels and prospects for the development of the situation
History teaches us: the systematic destruction of the rule of law results in severe upheavals for the state. Russia has already gone through periods of legal chaos more than once, and each time the consequences were catastrophic for the ruling regime and society. The current situation has direct parallels with several historical eras:
• Autocracy and the fall of tsarism (early 20th century): The Russian Empire managed to carry out the judicial reform of 1864, introducing an independent jury, but by the beginning of the 20th century the authorities increasingly resorted to extrajudicial repression. During the revolution of 1905 and later, the government responded to protests with political terror - Stolypin's military field courts handed down thousands of death sentences, reprisals against peaceful demonstrations (like the shooting of workers at the Lena goldfields in 1912) undermined the people's trust. By 1917, the social contract was destroyed: the masses no longer believed that the law could protect them, because the government itself acted without laws. As a result, the monarchy collapsed - largely due to the loss of legitimacy. The Provisional Government attempted to establish new freedoms, but it was too late: the chaos created by the long legal vacuum led to the seizure of power by more radical forces.
• Soviet-era repressions: After the establishment of Soviet power, the old legal system was completely eliminated; instead of legality, “revolutionary expediency” was proclaimed. This resulted in the Red Terror and the Civil War – years when killings and confiscations took place without trial or on purely formal charges. Then, in the 1930s, Stalin launched the “Great Terror” – the apogee of lawlessness. In 1937-1938, about 1.5 million people were shot or sent to camps on trumped-up political charges. Tribunals and closed trials rubber-stamped death sentences in minutes, signing pre-prepared lists. Millions of citizens became victims, and trust was destroyed – people lived in fear, not knowing why they themselves might be taken away tomorrow. The state was losing its support: even in the nomenklatura, no one felt safe. After Stalin's death, the new leadership itself acknowledged the lawlessness of those years and rehabilitated many of the innocently convicted. However, by that time, Soviet society was deeply traumatized by the experience of living "in the grip of lawlessness." This trauma had an impact in the following decades - the people lost the habit of trusting the authorities, and cynicism and caution became firmly entrenched in the mass consciousness.
• The Decline of the USSR: In the late Soviet period, the ruling elite, mindful of Stalin's excesses, tried to maintain the appearance of legality, but the "social contract" between the people and the authorities actually fell apart. The Communist Party promised citizens stability and social guarantees in exchange for loyalty and restrictions on political freedoms. However, by the 1980s, economic stagnation and the privileges of the nomenklatura undermined the fairness of the system so much that citizens stopped believing the propaganda. Glasnost and democratic reforms of the late 1980s revealed a mass of hidden lawlessness – from corruption to the truth about past repressions. It turned out that behind the facade of socialist legality there was a sea of falsehood. As a result, when the Union center lost control ь, the Soviet legal system fell apart in just a few months in 1991 - the republics declared sovereignty, laws ceased to operate uniformly, the era of the legal vacuum of the 90s began.
International examples show that this process is universal:
• Zimbabwe (2000s): The government of Robert Mugabe, under the slogan "land to the people", began confiscating farms from white landowners. Formally, this was presented as the restoration of justice, but in fact - the transfer of the best farms to cronies. In a matter of years, agricultural exports collapsed, inflation reached millions of percent, and the economy itself found itself in a state of collapse.
• Venezuela (2000-2010s): Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro nationalized the oil industry, banks, telecommunications companies, subordinating the courts and the prosecutor's office. The result - capital flight, the collapse of the national currency and a mass exodus of the population. Formally, everything was accompanied by references to “legality,” but justice was tame.
• Argentina (2001–2002): During the economic crisis, the government froze bank deposits (corralito) and restricted citizens’ access to their own funds. The judiciary justified these measures by citing the “highest interests of the state,” which undermined trust in banks and the right to private property for decades.
• Chile (1970s–1980s): After the 1973 military coup, the regime of Augusto Pinochet eliminated independent courts and introduced emergency laws that allowed thousands of people to be detained without trial. Economic reforms were carried out against the backdrop of a crackdown on the opposition and a merger of power with big business.
• Turkey (post-2016): Following the coup attempt, the Erdogan government carried out massive purges of the judiciary, the army, education, and the media. Tens of thousands of people were arrested on charges of “terrorism” without a transparent trial, and confiscated businesses and media were handed over to loyal structures.
• Germany in the 1930s: The Nazi regime effectively destroyed independent courts, turning them into an instrument of suppression and “legitimization” of repression against Jews, political opponents, and any “undesirable” persons. Laws were adopted retroactively to justify confiscations and arrests that had already been committed.
Comparing these lessons of history with today, we can make an alarming conclusion: the current course of breaking the rule of law leads the state system to self-destruction. In conditions where the courts do not protect citizens, and the laws instill fear and hatred, power is maintained only by force and coercion. But the force resource is not infinite - economic difficulties, military adventures, and internal resistance are growing as the regime tightens. The social contract in Russia today is effectively broken: the population must submit to more and more draconian rules, receiving neither security nor well-being in return. Many now comply with the laws only out of fear of the punitive system, and not out of an inner conviction in their fairness. This situation is extremely unstable.
The prospects for further destruction of the system paint a gloomy picture. If the authorities do not change course, several scenarios are possible. The first is a further escalation of repression up to complete totalitarianism: all who disagree will be declared enemies and eliminated, any dissent will be suppressed. However, history shows that such a regime outlives itself - the country is economically and intellectually exhausted, and in the event of a crisis (for example, a military defeat or economic collapse), popular discontent spills out rapidly and sweeps away the weakened elite. The second scenario is growing chaos: when the law does not work, people begin to solve problems by force or cunning, criminality grows, regional elites cease to obey the center. This threatens the collapse of the state or outbreaks of civil conflicts. The third scenario is spontaneous protests and revolution: the accumulating irritation from injustice can result in a sudden explosion (as happened in February 1917 or in August 1991). At such a moment, the repressive apparatus often turns out to be powerless, because it loses the support of even its own rank-and-file executors. In any case, there is no sustainable future for a system that has destroyed the principles of law. It is noteworthy that even now, according to human rights activists, thousands of people continue to fight for their rights - they write complaints, appeal illegal decisions, and go on solo pickets. This means that the demand for justice in society is alive, and sooner or later it will find a way out. A state that has forgotten about the law is threatened with the fate of a colossus with clay feet: outwardly powerful, but ready to collapse from a small push. The collective agreement between society and the government has been destroyed by the government itself – and without it, it is impossible to keep society under control for long.
Historical parallels suggest that the restoration of the rule of law is the only way to prevent the coming catastrophe. If the course remains the same, Russia risks repeating the most tragic pages of its history, when the price for returning to the law was measured ь broken destinies and lost years. In other words, the destruction of the rule of law is a path to the abyss, and the further the state goes down it, the more painful the subsequent fall and the longer the recovery will be.
Conclusion: modern Russia clearly demonstrates how consistent violation of laws by the authorities leads to a crisis of statehood. Court decisions that contradict common sense and "cannibalistic" laws undermine the foundations of a civilized society. Political repression and the redistribution of property in the interests of a narrow circle have destroyed public trust. Without an urgent return to the principles of the rule of law, the country risks facing mass unrest and the collapse of civil harmony. Russian history is rich in examples of when lawlessness at the top led to disasters for the entire country - from revolutions to dictatorships. It is in the interests of the state itself to stop this negative spiral before it is too late, otherwise the current system has only one prospect: it will fall under the weight of its own tyranny, as has happened more than once in the past. Legality is the framework that holds up the building of the state; if you remove the supports, collapse is inevitable. Today's situation is a clear confirmation of this truth and a serious warning about the need for change.
Timofey Grishin
